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ABSTRACT 
In this research we present a stylized financial agent-based model with 
heterogeneous noise traders that imitate each other on a dynamic network structure. 
Following Tedeschi et al. (2009, 2012), we show how an expectation feedback system 
can reproduce synchronization effects generating large fluctuations in returns. Moreover, 
we assess how ‘herding’ can give rise to some stylized facts such as volatility clustering 
and fat tailed distributions in some investigated variables such as indegree or returns, 
(see Cont, 2001). We demonstrate how the transition from periods of network 
centralization, corresponding to high synchronization in agents’ expectations, to periods 
of decentralization, when traders play randomly, is the key ingredient to reproduce these 
statistical properties above-mentioned. The model is an evolution of Tedeschi’s (2009), 
since we introduce and endogenous evolution mechanism of the intensity of choice, β. 
Here this parameter is updated daily according to the guru’s surviving period. Our 
findings show that there exists a strong correlation between the “guru evolution” and the 
returns time series. 
 
Keywords: volatility clustering, fat-tail distributions, noise traders, intensity of 
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. 
1.1. Agent Based Model. 
 Agent Based Models (from now onwards AMBs) are computational systems used 
to simulate and observe the actions and interactions of individuals within artificial 
markets. Basically, they help us to analyze more complex environments via the 
interaction of many heterogeneous agents. According to this view, a market economy 
can be analyzed as a self-organizing entity. In many complex systems in nature, there 
are global phenomena that are the irreducible result of local interactions between 
components whose individual study would not allow us to see the global properties of 
the whole combined system. Thus, a growing number of researchers show that many 
macro properties of the economic system are not directly encoded by any of the single 
components involved, but are the self-organization outcomes of the interactions of the 
components. Thus, given the presence of imperfections in the market organization, 
economic dynamics is the result of the communication and interaction of a myriad of 
heterogeneous agents and not the fruit of some invisible hand optimal process. 
In a recent paper, Iori & Porter (2012) show strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach. On the one hand, the usage of these simulations are supported in order to 
better understand the economy and the financial markets as an evolving system to 
prevent the financial crisis. On the other, some skeptical economists hardly criticize the 
usage of these simulations by claiming that these models pay too much attention to the 
well-known “stylized facts”1 from the temporary financial series, which are inconsistent 
with the standard asset pricing models. However, Farmer & Foley (2009) highlight the 
lack of clarity about asset pricing models and recognize the necessity of going beyond 
as well as applying the ABM methodology to create wider models able to incorporate 
multiple markets. Indeed, the CRISIS Project and FuturICT knowledge Accelerator are 
the most relevant undertaken projects that have made an attempt to create a large-scale 
market model. However, as Iori & Porter (2012) suggest  
it is generally accepted that there are many empirical financial 
phenomena which are difficult to explain using traditional models. As 
many authors have noted the empirical distributions of returns of many 
market indices and currencies, over different but relatively short time 
intervals, shows an asymptotic power law decay (Mandelbrot (1963); 
Pagan (1996); Guillaume et al. (1997); Gopikrishnan et al. (1999).  
                                                          
1  It has been detected a set of empirical common properties in asset returns in most of research. This 
“stylized facts” are analyzed by Cont (2001). 
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1.2. Modelling approaches. 
The ABM that we introduce is a financial market model where the market 
mechanism is the major area of interest. In order to build a model with these 
characteristics, it is important to understand both the structure of the market and the 
modeling of behavior. First, regarding the market structure, as we will see in the following 
sections, our model is based on a decentralized market where it does not exist a market 
maker such as risk neutral and endowed with unbounded liquidity, whose function is 
absorbing surpluses and making trading always viable. Second, regarding the modeling 
of agents’ behaviors, we refer to the herding and social learning phenomena further 
developed by Tedeschi (2016) and Tedeschi, Iori & Gallegati (2009, 2012) where the 
agents known as “noise traders” or “zero intelligence agents” base their expectations on 
the expectations of others investors to whom they are connected, which are “gurus” or 
links that will be updated through a fitness mechanism. 
In order to comprehend the proposed modeling approach, we have to highlight its 
three key ingredients: i) zero intelligence agents, ii) which interact through a market 
mechanism in order trade stocks and iii) interacting directly in order to form their 
expectations on prices. In the next subsections, we present how agent-based literature 
deals with these three classes of models. 
1.2.1. Zero Intelligence Agents 
ZI Agents Models are mainly based on an investigation or research with noise 
traders, who are able to significantly vary from a completely random behavior to the fact 
of having a budgetary limitation or some short of specific strategy. In general, we can 
pinpoint two main characteristics in the vast majority of these models: lack of (explicit) 
learning and a minimalist approach to agent behavior. 
Even though there exists some previous work elaborated by Becker (1962), the 
first investigation on ZI trading for financial market was conducted by Gode & Sunder 
(1993). While they were trying to describe what a ZI agent is about, they noted that “it 
has no intelligence, does not seek or maximize profits, and does not observe, remember, 
or learn. It seems appropriate to label it as a zero-intelligence trader” (p.4, 1993). In fact, 
the researchers also compared the behavior of profit-motivated human traders to ZI 
agents and then divided their investigation into three main stages. Firstly, they use the 
mechanism of a double auction where buyers and sellers submit limit orders bids or asks 
and can accept these bids or asks, all of them subject to budget constraints. In the 
second double auction, the same subjects are subject to no budget constraint. In the 
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third stage, they deeply analyze the results and draw on the main conclusions. The key 
result is that for their model, in terms of the aggregate property of allocative efficiency2, 
ZI traders perform comparably well to human traders. 
In the same line of research, Duffy & Únver (2006) conducted an experiment in 
order to examine whether a simple ABM can generate bubbles and similar crashes to 
the ones that have already been observed in previous experiments. This study focuses 
on better understand the behavior of ZI agents in order to deal with the characteristics of 
asset bubble environments, making it possible through near-zero-intelligence traders in 
a double auction context as in the previous model. 
1.2.2.  Heterogeneous Agents with Market Mediated interactions. 
This class of models try to emphasize some important characteristics of the 
different mechanisms of price formation, that is the detail of how exchanges occur in 
financial markets. In this regard, stock markets can be organized in different ways. There 
are, for example, supply demand in-balance markets which require the presence of a 
market maker, double action and order-driven markets. Among the several financial 
agent-based models, some works have paid more attention to the fact of reproducing 
the behavioral rules of traders, others, instead, have focused the analysis on the market 
microstructures. Very few models, however, have jointly combined agents’ 
microfoundation with markets’ microstructures. 
The model of Caldarelli et al (1997) was one of the former ones which introduced 
this sort of models. Thus, a prototypical stock market model is proposed, in which only 
the interactions among traders without external influences are taken into account. Each 
agent trades according to his/her own strategy by speculating about the prices 
fluctuations of the artificial market. Again, this model reproduces a record of prices very 
close to the ones observed in the real financial markets. 
Moreover, Lux & Marchesi (1999) described a financial market model with chartists 
and fundamentalists, which gave rise to scaling laws. Here there is a market maker 
reacting to imbalances between demand and supply. The fundamentalist agents 
purchase or sell if the value of the market is beyond or below the fundamental value 
while the chartists form a more heterogeneous group due to the fact that they are 
constantly changing from positive to negative expectations and the other way round, 
which will clearly define their role as buyers or sellers. A burst of volatility is produced if 
                                                          
2 Allocative efficiency is total profit divided by maximum total profit, or sum of consumer and producer surplus. 
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the proportion of agents, which use chartist strategies, overcomes a given threshold. 
These stages of instability are rapidly over and it is known as “on-off-intermittency”3. 
The above models use some kind of switching, either between classes or 
strategies. For instance, Chiarella & Iori (2002) built a market model with agents that 
used mixed strategies with different weight or components. Introducing an order-driven 
market model with heterogeneous agents trading via a central order matching 
mechanism, the researchers examined how different trading strategies may affect the 
dynamics of price, bid-ask, trading volume and volatility. Attention is also given to how 
some features of market design (tick size and order lifetime) affect market liquidity. 
In the same vein, Chiarella & Iori (2009) show an order driven market similar to the 
one designed in 2002 where agents based their expectations on future asset returns on 
weighted average of three different components: fundamentalist, chartist and noise 
trader. Furthermore, agents differ in the characteristics describing these components, 
such as time horizon, risk aversion and the weights given to the various components. 
The key result from this investigation is that the chartist strategies are responsible of 
generating fat tails and clustering in the artificial price data generated by the model. Also, 
it shows that the increase of volatility is probably due to the presence of large gaps in 
the book because of the expectations from both chartist and fundamentalist components. 
1.2.3. Heterogeneous Agents with Direct Interactions.  
In the models with direct interactions, that is to say, without any mechanism that 
mediates among agents, we can observe that these include sophisticated learning 
behaviors and explicit modeling of the direct interactions of agents. Thus, there exist 
three different levels of direct interactions: (a) global interactions, where an agent 
uniformly randomly interacts with another agent, (b) local interactions on a lattice, where 
interactions are constrained to a set of neighbors but in a regular way and (c) local 
interactions on a network which can evolve from early models where the network is 
assumed to later models where the network structure may arise endogenously. 
A canonical investigation on this type of models was developed by Kirman (1993). 
This investigation included the idea of herding by using ants as the object of their study. 
The ants rely on two random food sources from which they can change through an 
individual process of recruitment: two ants meet and one switches to another’s source 
with probability (1-δ) even though there exists an additional probability ϵ that an ant 
                                                          
3   This concept of market behavior is explain more extensively by Lux and Marchesi (2000). 
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changes from one source to another with no interaction. The experiment shows that 
initially the ants are more focused on one of the sources and that later on they change 
their attention through herding, phenomenon that is compared to human when choosing 
a certain restaurant.  
Based on the experiments carried out by Kirman (1993) and Lux & Marchesi 
(2000), Westerhoff (2009) develops an agent-based financial market model where the 
agents may follow technical and fundamental rules to determine their speculative 
investment position. The mechanism of opinion changes here is more sophisticated than 
Kirman’s (1993). The probability that agents adopt a new speculation strategy will 
depend on the past profits of that strategy. This is achieved by means of fitness variables 
AC y AF for chartist strategies and fundamental ones respectively, each a discounted sum 
of the past returns. This switching leads to periods where fundamental strategies 
dominates the markets and consequently prices fluctuate around its fundamental value 
and there will be other periods dominated by technical strategies, which result in an 
increase in volatility, spectacular bubbles and crashes. 
Challet, Marsili & Zhang (2000) introduced the concept known as Minority Game4 
in their model. One of the most relevant parts of this investigation is based on observing 
what happens when an agent knows ahead of time the actions of a subset of other 
agents. This can vary its strategies in relation to the tendencies that it observes and 
consequently, it always wins at least the average of other agents. 
A simple model of stock market with a random communication structure is also 
provided in Cont & Bouchaud (2000) where the interactions among agents give raise to 
heavy tails in the distribution of stock price variations in the form of an exponentially 
truncated power law. The key element of the model is communication between agents, 
which is modeled here by a set of clusters that coordinate individual demand. This model 
thus indicates a relation between the excess kurtosis observed in asset returns, the 
market order flow, and the tendency of market participants to imitate each other. 
Last but not least, Tedeschi, Iori & Gallegati (2012) suggest a very similar model 
to the one suggested in our experiment. The researchers introduce an order-driven 
market with heterogeneous traders where the concept of herding becomes completely 
relevant. The agents, mainly “noise traders” have the incentive of imitating themselves 
                                                          
4  The basic Minority Game was formulated by physicists Damien Challet and Yi-Cheng Zhang in 1997 to 
avoid the main obstacle of the El Farol problem, the definition of agents´ strategies.  
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among them, which causes the appearance of the so-called “gurus”5. Thanks to the 
fitness mechanism that measures the relative wealth from the previous period of an 
agent i , agents ZI are able to change their willingness to follow an agent k by another 
new agent (guru) j . Thus, thanks to this mechanism, gurus can rise and fall in popularity 
over time. One of the main results of this experiment is that the suggestions that noise 
traders quickly go bankrupt and are eliminated from the market is unrealistic in presence 
of herding and the expectations feedback system6 and positive intelligence agents 
cannot invade a market populated by noise trader when herding is high. 
1.3. What we propose: and introduction to our model. 
In this section we present a financial market model able to reproduce important 
regularities emerging in financial time series. The main goal of this research is to identify 
the main conditions under which imitation leads to fat tails and volatility clustering and 
how herding effects may be responsible for the persistence of asset price. Even though 
stocks returns are uncorrelated, the absolute values are auto correlated. For this reason, 
they reflect an inclination to move from quiet periods to more turbulent ones. Regarding 
the surviving period of significant positive autocorrelation of absolute stock returns, they 
last for a year or more, and they decay at a rate which is slower than exponential. 
We develop an expectation feedback system populated by noise traders. Initially, 
these agents start with the same amount of wealth. As time goes by, some of them will 
became richer than others and consequently, heterogeneous, according with the 
empirical evidence that the market participants are very heterogeneous in size. 
Moreover, in contrast with the prevailing economic view that informed agents need to 
hide their private informations in order to profit it, (see Benabouy and Laroque, 1992; 
Caldentey and Stacchetti, 2007), our uninformed gurus gain the highest profits when 
they reveal their expectations to the highest number of followers. The generation of 
“herding” that provokes excess demand, bubbles and volatility clustering is conducted 
by the introduction of an endogenous mechanism of imitation. By using a preferential 
attachment rule (Barabasi and Alberti, 1999), each trader is followed by another one with 
a probability proportional to its profit. 
                                                          
5  In our artificial financial market model each agent has an outgoing link and can have various incoming 
links. The agent with most incomings links is known as the “guru”. 
6  “Positive feedback in a stock market refers to the situation where positive (negative) expectations 
about the price do lead to a price increase (decrease)” (Tedeschi, Iori and Gallegati, 2012). 
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 Besides, this mechanism generates an evolving network structure ranging from 
the random graph to the power-law one7. This allows us to analyze how the imitation 
among traders affects the evolution of the network topology and how it has influence on 
market returns. Most of the studies on herding effects have examined how herding can 
go along with large price fluctuation but only a few papers have investigated its role on 
the communication network structure and on traders’ wealth, which is one of the main 
aims of the present study.  
It is crucial to understand how expectations feedback system with ‘zero intelligence 
agents’ works. If a guru shares pessimistic expectations about an asset, he/she decides 
to sell. His/her followers imitate his/her strategy driving to a higher fall in the prices. Thus, 
the guru has cash to buy a higher amount of assets than he/she had at the beginning. 
Conversely, if a guru shares an optimistic expectation about an asset, he/she decides to 
buy. The neighbors that follow his/her strategies imitate the guru’s strategy driving prices 
up. In this moment, the guru has assets that he/she bought cheaper.  
The agents in our market are zero intelligence agents which present random 
expectations about future returns and a random demand function. This differs to other 
models where sophisticated strategies are implemented (Brock and Hommes 1998; 
Chiarella et al. 2009; Lux and Marchesi 2000). This is due to several reasons. Firstly, 
they help us to deeply examine the impact of imitation on prices dynamics. Secondly, 
the analysis of the impact of noise traders on prices’ movement is thorough in the 
literature. For instance, some authors (Figlewski et al., 1979: Shiller, 1984; De Long et 
al., 1990) show that “irrational” aggressive noise traders can destabilize prices driving 
them away from the fundamental value and earn larger returns. 
The main reason for using this AMB to develop our model is that the mainstream 
economy literature does not provide us with satisfactory and adequate information to 
conduct a deep analysis of the situations of crisis. As Iori and Porter claim 
The highly stylized, analytically tractable traditional models in economics 
and finance are not well-suited to study crisis situations (Bouchaud [2008], 
Farmer and Foley [2009], Kirman [2010]; in fact there is no framework in 
classical economics for the understanding crises. ABMs on the contrary can 
                                                          
7 A power-law distribution is observed when, on the one hand, there are many individual elements with 
almost no popularity, and on the other, few elements with high popularity. 
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represent unstable systems with crashes and booms that develop out of non-
linear responses to proportionally small change (2012, p.2) 
Our findings show that the phenomenon of herding leads to a market populated by 
zero intelligence agents to present fat tail distributions and volatility clustering. In this 
context, we can observe two possible scenarios: (a) coordinated periods of strategies 
that produce bubble prices and volatility in returns, and (b) non-coordinated periods of 
strategies where returns remain stable and some agents compete to concentrate the 
majority of incoming links. 
The rest of the research is organized as follows. In section two we explain how the 
market works and which are its characteristics. In the next section we comment the main 
results obtained in the investigation. In section four we develop the main conclusions 
and to conclude we list the references used to conduct the experiment. 
2. THE MODEL. 
In this section we present how the communication and imitation among agents 
affect the expected returns and how our artificial market works. We implement a realistic 
mechanism of price formation based on the Euronext and the London Stock Exchange 
mechanism. In this financial market the price dynamics is determined by the structure of 
the exchange process without using any ad hoc mechanism. Agents of the artificial 
market may execute two types of orders: buy or sell. On the one hand, a trader can 
execute an order known as “market order to sell (buy)”. This instruction is automatically 
executed when the selling price (buying price), called ask (called bid) is lower (higher) 
than the market price. On the other hand, when a sell order (buy order) is higher (lower) 
than the market price, there is a “limit order to sell (buy)”. Limit orders are thus stored in 
the exchanges books expecting to be executed due to the market’s prices fluctuations. 
Thus, limit orders still unmatched after a predetermined time horizon are removed from 
the book. 
2.1. The market microstructure. 
We introduce an order driven market with all buyers and sellers displaying the 
prices at which they are willing to buy or sell securities, and the quantity of securities 
desired to be bought or sold. Our artificial model is populated by N traders that can place 
market and limit orders. Market orders are placed when a purchase or sale offer reaches 
a quote in the opposite side of the market and are immediately executed at the current 
best price on the list. On the contrary, limit orders are placed when a purchase or sale 
offer does not reach a quote on the opposite side of the market and are kept and 
executed in the exchange´s book using time and price priority.  
13 
 
It is through a number of periods (days) kt  with k = 1,…T  that trading takes places. 
In this way, there are τ intraday operations each day of trading. When the period starts, 
traders make expectations about the price at the end of a given time horizon Ƭ. Thus, 
the future price expected by agent i  at time kt  + τ is given by  
                                                   (1) 
Where is the agent’s expectation on the spot return which may be 
affected by the expectations of other agents due to the communication network among 
traders and is the price that all agents can see at the beginning of each period. 
Once agents have determined their expectations about the future price, they 
randomly enter the market to establish a limit price and an order size to submit their 
orders. Those traders with bullish expectations decide to purchase at price i
tb , which will 
obviously be lower than the expected future price . Those traders with 
bearish expectations decide to sell at price i
ta , which will be higher than in expected 
price. The purchase and sale price, namely bid and ask, are uniformly distributed around 
the current price and calculated according the following rule:
 
                                     (2) 
Where are random variables uniformly distributed in the interval (0,1) and   is 
the price at the time the order is submitted. In formula (2) it can be observed that the 
price that buyers are willing to pay is between
bpmin , which is the worst buy order, and the 
expected future price previously calculated . Conversely, the price that 
and apmaxsellers are willing to sell is between their future price expectation  
which corresponds to the best sell order in this moment.  
When transactions occur, price is recalculated as follows:  is calculated 
by the price at which a transaction occurs. If there are not occurring transactions, a proxy 
for the price is given by the average of the quoted ask q
ta  (the lowest ask listed in the 
book) and the quoted bid  (the highest bid listed in the book):      
14 
 
For this reason, the updated price with this proxy variable will be between the lowest 
selling price and the highest purchase price included in the book q
ta < pt < 
q
tb .  
The order book is the list of all buy and sell limit orders at a given instant of time, 
with their corresponding price and volumes. A limit order indicates the maximum (or 
minimum) price at which a trader is willing to buy (or sell) a certain quantity of shares. At 
a given point in time, all limit buy orders are below the best buy order called the ‘bid 
price’. On the other hand all sell orders are above the best sell order called the ‘ask 
price’. With the appearance of a new order, such as buy order, it either adds to the book 
if it is below the ask price, or generates a trade at the ask price if it is above (or equal to) 
it, (we call all these ‘market orders’). More in detail, if the maximum price that a buyer is 
willing to offer is higher than the price a seller is willing to sell, that is i
tb >
t
qa , agents 
place market orders to buy stocks at a current quoted ask 
t
qa . If it appears that the buyer 
wants to buy more stocks than available at this price, he/she will continue buying the 
next offer available until it satisfied their demand or when there is no more sell orders in 
the book at a price smaller than i
tb . If   
i
tb  >
t
qa  traders submit limit orders.  
Symmetrically, if the price at which a seller is willing to sell is lower than the current 
quoted bid, that is i
ta <
t
qb , then, investors place market orders to sell stock at a price 
t
qb
. If the demand available on the book at this price is not sufficiently large, he fills the 
available demand at the bid and then moves on to check the second best bid price, 
iterating the process until the agent has no more stock to sell or there are no more buy 
orders in the book at a price greater than i
ta . 
In our financial market, agents have a random demand function and the size of 
their order is only bounded by budget constraints. Agents hold a finite amount of cash 
and stocks  in their portfolio. The size  of agents’ orders is 
determined as follows: 
- If the agents expect a price decrease, they sell a random fraction of their 
assets   
- If the agents expect a price increase, they invest a random fraction of their 
cash in the assets equal to 
if they execute/submit a limit order 
 if they execute/submit a market order (agents buy at the 
current ask) 
with  to be a random variable uniformly distributed on the interval (0,1). 
15 
 
The essential details of the trading mechanism can be explained easily. We can find four 
different situations: 
- When an agent is willing to sell a random fraction of his/her stock at a lower 
price (price per asset) than the buying quoted price, place a market order to 
sell that will be executed at the best buying price in that specific moment. 
- When this agent is willing to sell a random fraction of his/her stock a higher 
price (price per asset) than the buying quoted price, place a limit order to be 
kept in the order book awaiting for the selling quoted price to decrease in order 
to be executed. 
- When an agent is willing to buy a random amount of stock at a higher price 
(price per asset) than the selling quoted price, place a market order to buy that 
will be executed at the lowest selling price in that specific moment. 
-      When this agent is willing to buy an amount of stock at a lower price (price per 
asset) than the buying quoted price, place a limit order to buy to be kept in the order 
book awaiting for the selling quoted prices to decrease in that specific moment. 
When agents execute a market order, their cash and stock amounts proportionally 
vary to such order. When agents execute a limit order, even though there is no change 
in the composition of the portfolio in that moment, the cash they commit to buy and the 
stocks they commit to sell are also temporarily removed from their portfolios. In this way, 
agents cannot spend money or sell stocks that have already been committed in the book. 
If the order is cancelled, the stocks and cash that were retained are returned in the 
portfolios of the corresponding agents. 
2.2. The agents’ microfoundation. 
The market we present consists of zero intelligent agents, also known as “noise 
traders”. These agents are heterogeneous. Therefore, at the beginning of each day they  
have different expectations about the spot return    in the interval 
and have different forecasts of the returns’ volatility, σ i
tk
. Expected returns are thus given 
by  
     (3) 
where σ i
tk
 is a positive, agent specific, constant and ϵ t  ̴ N(0,1) is a normal noise. In order 
to determine how the interaction among agents affects asset price and volatility returns, 
we have introduced a communication structure in which nodes represent agents and the 
hedges are the connective links between them. 
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Thanks to this communication network, traders ask opinion on other traders, more 
precisely on their neighborhood, so they can revise and change their expectations and 
consequently their future price (see Eq.1). Specifically, we model an imitation 
mechanism, by implementing a preferential attachment rule (Barabasi and Albert, 1999) 
such that each trader is imitated by others with a probability proportional to its wealth. 
The noise trader is the agent i , who imitates agent j , known as the guru. Therefore, 
the agent i  updates his/her expected returns according to the trader j , this is   
 
All agents depart from the same level of economic wealth W t=0 = Ct=0 + pt=0St=0. 
Clearly, as times passes by and operations are performed, some of them become richer 
than others, what strongly determines who imitates and who is being imitated. In order 
to quantify the agents’ success, we use a measure that indicates us the fitness from 
every agent at time t as well as their wealth relative to the wealth W t
max
 of the richest 
agent i max : 
                                                         f
i
t
=
W
i
t
W t
max
                                                         (4) 
Each agent i  starts with one outgoing with a random agent j , that is to say, each agent 
can only imitate one guru’s strategy and, instead, can have several incoming links from 
other agents. At the beginning of each period, links are rewinded as it follows: each agent 
i cuts his outgoing link, with agent k, and forms a new link with a randomly chosen agent
j , with a probability: 
                                                                             (5)         
and with a probability equal to 1 - p
i
t  
of keeping  his/her actual link.  Gurus are the most 
successful ones, which will make them obtain higher fitness, and as consequence they 
will have more probabilities to obtain more incoming links. In order for the links not to be 
directed and exclusively to the gurus with more fitness, the algorithm introduces a certain 
amount of randomness modeling imperfect information and bounded rationality of agents 
so as the links with more successful agent have a finite probability to be cut in favor of 
links with less successful ones. The parameter β in Eq. (5) represents the intensity of 
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choice and indicates the trust that traders have in the information (expectation) about 
other agents’ performance. If β is zero, agents act in an independent way from one 
another. However, when β increases, the agents have more similar behaviors and their 
rationality increases due to the fact that they have more confidence on the guru’s 
expectations and there are more agents that actually copy their strategies. Somewhat, β 
measures the “imitative behavior”, since the more beneficial strategy will attract more 
confidence from the noise traders and, thus, it will have more agents imitating it. In our 
model, β is related to the guru’s life span:  the longer the period the guru survives, the 
higher his signal credibility. We set β equal to 1 and increase it by more than 1 every day 
the guru survives. When the guru is replaced, the new β is set again to the value of 1.   
3. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS. 
3.1. Implementation of the model. 
In order to proceed with the market simulation, we have worked with data in C 
language. By using the software “Code Blocks”, the numerical orders have been 
transformed into financial market simulations. For this reason, before advancing the 
results obtained in this research, some fundamental aspects of the programming process 
have to be mentioned. Specifically, we present five essential elements that cannot be 
omitted in order to compile the C source code and the two principal functions of our 
model: the Matrix and the Trade functions. Once we explain its main characteristics, the 
basic syntax of the C language can be further understood. Thus, the programming 
process includes the flowing steps: libraries, defines, global variables, functions 
declaration and main function. 
3.1.1.  Libraries 
This is the first stage of the programming process. As shown in Figure 1, libraries 
include useful functions for different types of tasks. For this reason, depending on the 
experiment conducted we decide to execute the libraries that contain the specific 
functions in order to achieve it. This operation uses the directive #include. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of libraries to be executed. 
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3.1.2. Defines 
Once we have established the library to be employed, the second stage is to define 
the set of basic parameters. Besides, we assign the initial values to these parameters by 
establishing the starting conditions of the system. This operation uses the directive 
#define. 
 
 
 
 
 
Each line of Figure 2 shows a variable along with its respective initial value. For 
instance, the variable “VOL” indicates that one hundred traders compose our market. In 
the same way, the variable “DAY” shows the different intra-day negotiation periods so we 
can deduce that there are three hundred negotiation periods every single day. 
3.1.3. Global Variables 
In this third stage, two types of variables using data in language C can be defined: 
global and local. After the definition of #define, the global variable is immediately called 
in the main body of the source code apart from the rest of functions. Besides, these 
variables exist in any part of the source code in contrast to the local, which only exists 
inside a function that performs a specific task. In this way, local variables recur each time 
that the function is called or executed. On the contrary, global variables do not need to 
be created each time that a function is called as we can see in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Both global and local variables may differ depending on the type. The language C 
provides several, but we have only employed five types of available variables: char 
(characters), int (basic integer type), long (long integer type), float (single precision 
floating point) and double (double precision floating point). 
3.1.4. Functions declaration 
In this stage, the programmer must declare the functions that he/she is going to 
use in the source code. Moreover, with the declaration function we determine the set of 
instructions that implement the model’s behaviors into the source code. 
Figure 2. Examples of parameters employed in this model. 
Figure 3. An example of a global variable. 
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There are two different options to declare a function, but it is the void function the 
one we have employed in this model due to its flexibility and simplicity (see Figure 4). 
 
 
 
3.1.5. Main Function  
All the elements used in our model must be included into the main function in order 
to be compiled and executed by the machine. The compiler only executes what lies within 
its curly braces { }. For this reason, we claim that the main function is the core of every 
program. Figure 5 shows a stylized example of how all elements are included into the 
main function. 
 
 
In the previous section, we have just emphasized the importance of including all 
the elements into the main function to be executed by the machine. In order to conclude 
with the description of the programming process, the most important functions of the 
main: 
 
 
Figure 5.A stylized example of included elements into the main function in our Financial Model. 
Figure 4.The typical function declaration in our Financial Model. 
20 
 
3.1.5.1. The Matrix Functions. 
There are two functions that describe the network topology that we use: Matrix1 
and Matrix3. 
Matrix1: This function implements a random attachment among traders. The most 
common situation is to assume a random interaction as the initial configuration of an 
evolving network at the beginning of the simulation period and when we have no 
connections between nodes. However, we have slightly modified the mechanism of 
attachment in order to allow a set of topologies, ranging from a pure random network to 
a star one8. 
Matrix3: The objective of this function is to create a fitness network. By using this 
function, three actions in the market are executed on a daily basis: 
 Traders randomly select a new possible neighbor, j. As previously 
explained, each period links are rewinding according to the probabilistic 
rule express by Eq. 5. 
 Traders calculate the probability of switching from the old neighbor, k, to 
the new selected, j. 
 Each trader chooses his/her neighbors. 
 
By using Equation 4, we are able to detect the trader with the highest fitness and 
consequently the highest profit. Thus, the agent with most fitness- namely the guru- will 
have the maximum probability to acquire the highest amount of incoming links.  
Also, we have to keep in mind that both Matrix1 and Matrix 3 are dichotomous 
since they perform the same task in different ways. We run Matrix1 in the first steps of 
the simulation and then only Matrix3 is executed. 
 
3.1.5.2. The Trade Function. 
This is the function that represents the real core of the model’s implementation. 
In the first part, we find a set of definitions of local variables, which set up the initial 
condition of both traders and book’s variables. The next step is to write down the loops 
that govern the passage of time. We have to do it carefully though since the time’s loops 
have daily and intra-day operations. 
                                                          
8 A star network is a topology of centralized network where there is a central node which connect 
all nodes. In this study it is a guru that will concentrates the vast majority of incoming links as time 
passes by. 
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In the first days of simulation, we use the Matrix1 function to initialize our 
interaction structure. Consecutively, we execute the Matrix3 to load the fitness network. 
Once the dMarketMatrix is filled, the total amount of incoming and outcoming links can 
be counted to establish the id of the neighbor that each node is going to imitate. This 
information will be helpful to better understand how imitation spreads among traders 
within the network and to detect the agent that will be the guru that specific day. 
When the guru of that day is already identified, the most important parameter of 
our study, the intensity of choice, β9, comes into play. In order to set the value of this 
parameter, we need to count the consecutive days in which a certain agent survives as 
a guru. 
Finally, the last part of the Trade Functions is where traders form expectations; 
submit their orders of buying and selling and where all the operations are registered in 
the check_ book function. 
3.2. Parameters of the model. 
In the artificial market there are a number of traders equal to N = 100. All agents 
start with the same amount of wealth. Precisely, each agent is initially given an amount 
of stock equal to S0 = 100 and an amount of cash equal to C0 = 1000. The initial stock 
price is chosen at p0 = 1000. We also fix T = 300. Also, we conduct T = 2000 periods of 
simulation. There are Nt = 300 trades per period. Simulations are repeated M = 10 times 
with a different random seed. 
 After describing all the variables and parameters, the following section presents 
how these simulations reproduce some stylized facts observed emerging in financial 
markets (see Cont 2001). We begin by showing that the market evolves endogenously 
to periods of decentralized network to periods of centralized network. Then we study 
same statistical properties of the network topology to demonstrate that our network is 
not a random graph and we show how the wealth of agents keeps evolving. Then we 
show the correlation among the guru life, the in-degree and the fitness measure and how 
it is correlated with returns times series and the intensity of choice. To conclude the 
discussion of results, we introduce how the autocorrelation of absolute returns are 
distributed as a power law. 
 
                                                          
9  As we have already explained, the longer is the guru life, the higher β. In other words, the more 
consolidated an agent is while being the most imited trader, the more confident the other trades 
will be in their strategies and thus, the probability of being imitated will also increase 
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3.3. Discussion: the network analysis. 
At this point, the reader may already acknowledge that the network of our model 
is dynamic, what means that its architecture evolves as times passes. Figure 6 shows 
us the step 939 of our research, where traders 38 and 10 are competing to become a 
guru. This is an unstable period in which few gurus co-exist and compete for popularity. 
In the absence of a guru dominating the market, the strategies that noise traders imitate 
are diverse and there exists no coordination among their strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 illustrates that after a certain period of time, concretely in the step 973, 
one agent has achieved to be the guru even though the network still is decentralized. 
The reason is that the parameter β (the intensity of choice) is not really high due to the 
fact that this agent is guru for a brief period of time and that there exist some agents that 
do not trust his/her investment strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last possible modality of our model is a centralized network, where there exists 
coordination in the decision-making process. Now, the guru has a higher β. For this 
reason, the guru has more confidence on behalf of the agents and the vast majority of 
Figure 7. Model with a guru but not stable. 
Figure 6. Decentralized model. 
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them tend to imitate the strategies of the new guru. At this moment, price bubbles and 
volatility clustering are generated due to the strategic coordination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once explained how our network evolves, we investigate some important statistical 
properties identifying the network topology (see Figure 9). Specifically, we study the 
degree distribution (left panel), which shows the connectivity degree among traders 
within the network. We also check how the network architecture crucially depends on the 
intensity of choice β, (central panel), and finally, we analyze the average degree network 
centrality (right panel). This last concept indicates us how concentrated or centralized 
the direction of the links are. 
 
The left panel of Figure 9 shows that our network topology is not a random graph 
but that some agents will concentrate the majority of the network links. This fact let us 
classify the imitation network as a scale free10 whose degree distribution follows a power 
law. 
                                                          
10 A scale-free network in a complex type of network where some nodes poses a high amount of links to 
others nodes although most of their degree of connection is quite low. 
Figure 9. The decumulative distribution (DDF) of the in-degree (left panel), the intensity of 
choice βt (central panel) and the average network centrality over simulation (right panel). 
Figure 8. Centralized network and stable time of 
guru. 
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The central panel displays the distribution of the intensity of choice. In our model 
β plays a crucial role in the network architecture because, unlike previous studies, we 
introduce an endogenous evolution mechanism of this. This parameter positively 
depends on the guru’s live, which is in turn function of the guru fitness, of Eq.4. We 
briefly explain how β works: lower values of β make the network distributes randomly 
since there is no agent that has a higher confidence level. When the parameter β 
increases substantially, our market self-organizes into a pseudo-star where the guru 
concentrates almost all links. This is due to the fact that the market agents trust him/her. 
Central panel shows that the guru’s time distribution is heterogeneous. On the one hand, 
there are stable periods where there is a stable guru and the network is centralized. On 
the other hand, there are unstable periods where traders compete in order to become 
the guru and the network is decentralized. 
In the last panel (right panel), we observe the average degree network centrality11. 
In the graph we can clearly observe that the degree of centrality is low in the researching 
period, which are periods where the network is decentralized. Conversely, as time 
passes by, the degree of centrality increases, what means that some agent achieves a 
high level of intensity of choice and concentrates the majority of links. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our model, traders initially start with the same amount of stock and cash. 
However, as time goes by, herding generates a fat tail distribution in individuals’ wealth 
and stock (see Figure 10), in accordance with the initial hypothesis of our model that 
market participants are very heterogeneous in size. Now, we explain the mechanism 
driving the evolution of the imitation network and its impact on prices. As already 
stressed, traders start with the same amount of wealth, but thanks to the fitness 
measures (Eq. 4), some investors extend their numbers of followers and as a 
                                                          
11 We are using the Degree centrality but there exist many other such as closeness, betwenness, 
eigenvector and percolation. 
Figure 10. The decumulative distribution (DDF) of the wealth (left side) and the 
decumulative distribution (DDF) of the stocks (right side) 
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consequence, their wealth. We can easily understand the process with the following 
example: Let’s imagine that the guru has a bullish expectation on an asset and he/she 
decides to buy a certain amount at a price equal to 10. If he/she is able to execute a 
market order, all of his/her followers will imitate the strategy and the price of the asset 
will increase. For this reason, the guru obtains benefits since he/she possesses an asset 
which cost 10 and whose value is now, for instance, 14. Furthermore, since it has a 
higher wealth, his/her fitness and the number of followers also increase. With a major 
fitness, the likelihood that he/she remains the guru in the aftermath increases. In the 
same vein, the intensity of choice, β, is also increased, which further strengthens the 
guru fitness and his/her chances to persist over time. With this example, we can check 
how, in contrast to the prevailing economic view where informed agents need to hide 
their private information to obtain benefits (see Behanou and Laroque, 1992; Caldentey 
and Staccheti, 2007; Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2008), in our market the guru gains in the 
highest profits when they reveal their expectations to the highest number of followers. 
Specifically, the average wealth over time and simulation of guru, followers and non-
followers are 598280 (st.desv 5629), 36637 (st. dev 2543) and 2563 (st. dev 1067) 
respectively. 
3.4. The impact of herding on the returns.  
In order to analyze the competition and replacement dynamics driving “guru life 
cycle”, we run one Monte Carlo simulation of T =10000 periods12. 
Figure 11 shows the transition from unstable periods of decentralized networks in 
which agents compete to become the guru to stable periods in which the net is 
centralized and there is a guru that concentrates the majority of links. The black solid 
line is fragmented and very volatile in the periods that there is no guru. Clearly, these 
                                                          
12 The figure has been divided in two sub-graph in order to be clearer. In order to understand how 
the market works, it is enough with T= 5000. However, it is important to take into account that the 
cycle does not finish in this moment the network keeps evolving. 
 
Figure 11. The index of the current guru (black solid line), the percentage of incoming 
link to current guru (red dotted line) and fitness of current guru (green dashed line). 
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periods will present a low percentage of in-degree (red dotted line low values) and, also, 
with high fitness values of volatility since there is no agent that stands among the others 
(green dashed line unstable). Conversely, the black solid line is continuous when there 
exists a guru in the market. Generally, these moments coincide with a high percentage 
of in-degree (red dotted line high values) and with a much more stable and close fitness 
to one. 
During the periods of the guru’s stability, one or more of his/her followers may 
become richer than the guru himself/herself, as signaled by the fact that the fitness 
(green dashes line) of the guru becomes, at times, smaller than 1. As other agents 
become richer, they present a higher fitness and start to be imitated until they become 
the new guru. The mechanism of the guru replacement is very simple. A possibility of 
replacement may occur when the guru places a limit order, which is a buy/sell order not 
immediately executed. At this moment, one of his/her followers may take advantage of 
the guru’s information in order to place a market order, thus increasing his/her wealth at 
the expense of the guru. In doing so, the guru fitness will decrease and it may also 
determine his/her replacement. Another possibility is when, despite the guru placing a 
market order, the size of this order is less than the size of imitators. In this occasion, the 
guru’s wealth will increase but less than his/her imitator’s, what generates a replacement 
dynamics similar to that described above. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be observed in Figure 12, there is a strong correlation between volatility 
clustering (black solid line) and in-degree (red dotted line). This is due to the creation 
and destruction mechanism as well as the replacement of the guru in order to generate 
stock return volatility. It is not by chance that the highest returns moments coincide with 
the highest levels of in-degree percentages and intensity of choice (green dashed line). 
Figure 12.  Return time series (black solid 
line), the percentage of incoming link to 
current guru (red dotted line) and the 
intensity of choice, (green dashed line). 
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By having a high β, the guru has a higher in-degree and bubbles are produced up to the 
moment he/she is replaced. Moreover, the figure also shows the correlation between the 
life of the guru, the in-degree and the intensity of choice: the longest the life of the guru 
is, the greater the number of his/her imitators, the higher the parameter β. By comparing 
Figure 12 to the previous (Figure 11), we can examine the existing correlation between 
the “guru evolution” and the returns’ time series. Specifically, we observe that the 
moments of the return time series associated to coordination periods are far away from 
those observed in the Normal distribution (distribution will have a leptokurtic and 
asymmetric distribution and display fat-tails), while those associated to non-coordination 
periods better approach the Gaussian distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The last figure of this section (Figure 13) confirms the presence of volatility 
clustering. Figure 13, in fact, shows a positive and slowly decaying autocorrelation of 
absolute returns. Moreover, in line with the empirical evidence (see Cont 2001), the 
autocorrelation function of absolute returns is well fitted by a power law. If we presented 
the distribution of the returns’ autocorrelation, we could observe that it would show a fast 
decaying to zero, presenting thus no autocorrelation. For this reason, if there existed 
autocorrelation, the agents could conduct arbitrary strategies to obtain higher returns. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                 
  
Figure13. Autocorrelation of absolute returns 
and the power law best fit (red line). 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
 
In this work, we have presented a stylized agent-based model able to reproduce 
the standard stylized facts emerging in financial market. Through this toy model that 
relies on a number of ad-hoc exogenously imposed rules, we show that the model 
reproduces some of the most important properties emerging in the returns’ time series: 
returns have a leptokurtic and asymmetric distribution and display fat-tails. 
We have demonstrated that in an order driven market populated by zero intelligent 
agents emerge the well-known stylized facts such as fat tails and volatility clustering. By 
introducing an endogenous mechanism of imitation, it allows a guru to emerge 
spontaneously in the system, rise and fall in popularity over time, and possibly be 
replaced by a new guru. Moreover, this artificial market shows that, conversely to real 
markets where the highest benefits are obtained by hiding information regarding their 
investment strategies, our gurus obtain more benefits as more investors follow their 
strategies. This imitation of believes can generate coordination of trading and large 
returns fluctuations when the popularity of the guru slowly changes over time. In fact, it 
is the transition from coordination periods (centralized network with a guru absorbing the 
majority of links) to no-coordination periods (decentralized network with a few agents 
competing to become the guru), emerging thanks to a fitness mechanism based on 
agents wealth, which generates interesting prices dynamics.  
Furthermore, the endogenous communication structure has allowed us to analyze 
important properties of the network. Firstly, we have shown that herding generates fat 
tail distributions and leptokurtosis, since there is a guru in the model with a big probability 
of indegree (leptokurtic) and almost all agents follow him/her (heavy tail). Secondly, we 
have introduced an endogenous modification in the guru’s intensity of choice that let the 
model self-organize themselves into some different network topologies, ranging from 
random graph to scale-free topologies. 
To conclude this study, we have shown some important properties of the market. 
Specifically, herding is able to reproduce bubbles and consequently crashes and stages 
of aggrupation of volatility (volatility clustering). Moreover, the model is able to reproduce 
correlation between volatility clustering and the percentages of in-degree, and between 
the percentage of incoming links and the fitness of the current guru. 
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